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5Executive Summary
Central Europe is one of the European Union’s most astound-
ing success stories. Ten years after accession, the region 
speaks confidently for itself in Europe and in the wider world. 
Our countries1 have built on their historical legacy of resil-
ience and adaption to the jarring changes after 1989. Central 
Europe is now a growth engine for the wider EU economy. 
Thanks to the continued “catch-up” dynamic, consisting of 
lower wage costs, well trained labour force, healthier bank-
ing sector, and less public and private debt, our economies 
are expected to continue growing faster than Western Europe. 
The combined GDP of the four Visegrád Group countries al-
ready makes them the world’s 15th-biggest economy. 
Our second decade in the EU requires new plans and ambi-
tions. Central Europe should aim high—not just to match its 
counterparts, but wherever possible come up with a better 
proposition. The EU is very different than it was in 2004. Now 
is the time to capitalise on the opportunities which this rela-
tive economic strength affords. 
This report calls for the refashioning of the region’s growth 
model with a focus on a dramatic enhancement of its global 
competitiveness and innovation capacity. Closer ties with Au-
stria on the one hand and the Nordic-Baltic countries on the 
other would be especially important in that effort. 
6We argue that Central Europe should develop and cultivate 
its vision of its own region. It is not enough to rely on the 
slow convergence of living standards. The region also needs 
home-grown aspirations. Such an approach would also im-
prove prospects for the EU at large.
Problems with connectivity and cross-border infrastruc-
ture are identified in this Report as Central Europe’s main 
‘mission unaccomplished’. No less than 40 per cent of all EU 
cohesion funds for the budget period 2014 – 2020 are ear-
marked for this region, which provides unique public invest-
ment opportunities. Visegrád countries should synchronise 
their objectives, define regional performance benchmarks, 
and compose a list of strategic projects in transport infra-
structure. EU energy policy and funding for north-south in-
terconnections will help to enhance the energy security of 
our countries and create conditions for a resilient, transpar-
ent and competitive regional energy market. A crucial task 
is to establish one large, more liquid and better integrated 
capital-market hub in the region to help Central European 
companies to finance their needs. It is time to apply a re-
gional approach also to other areas crucial for our sustain-
able growth, such as: investment into R&D, innovation, and 
quality of education, as well as to demographic and social 
challenges.  
There are numerous “white and black swans” on the region’s 
horizon. Among them, aging and demographic decline 
stands out.  Its impending consequences on our economies, 
public finances and social structure are well-known and un-
derstood but insufficiently addressed so far. Our region is 
not yet prepared to manage an increase in immigration, and 
a much larger percentage of elderly citizens. Some coun-
tries face serious challenges to improve the education and 
employability of the largely socially excluded and rapidly 
growing Roma population. As pressures on public finances 
become more pronounced and regional disparities continue 
to increase, our countries must do their utmost to increase 
7labour force participation and to preserve the openness to 
talent, effort and ingenuity which has served them well since 
the times of transformation.
Security and defence is the principal area where Central Eu-
rope already speaks with a single voice. The Visegrád Group 
may well become an exemplar of the emerging trend in both 
NATO and EU to strengthen regional security. 
Closer cooperation among our governments is good for 
the EU and good for us. Central Europeans can make the 
EU’s future agenda more innovative and ambitious. Recent 
achievements and our promising future allow us to become 
more active in EU policy-making and more ambitious in 
shaping the Union’s future agenda towards a path that is 
more innovative and open to change. To be one of the key 
poles of political and economic dynamism in future, inter-
action with other like-minded EU partners is crucial. Far 
from having to be at the mercy of developments in the euro 
zone, Central Europe can develop an activist agenda to 
demonstrate how the EU can change in parallel with efforts 
to reform the economic and monetary union. 
We advocate:
•  Adapting the relationship with Germany towards one 
which helps the region move towards an innovation-driv-
en model of growth
•  Engaging actively in efforts to reconstruct the macroeco-
nomic governance system in the EU
•  Championing an activist growth and competitiveness 
agenda
•  Supporting reform of the community institutions towards 
greater effectiveness and accountability
8•  Showing by example how the EU can be a more relevant 
global voice, and sustain robust, attentive and effective 
influence in its neighbourhood. 
This agenda is within reach. The region’s policy-makers 
need to want to make it happen. 
1  In this report, ‘Central Europe’ refers to four Visegrád Group countries (the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) plus Austria, which form one eco-
nomic area and a backbone of a wider Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 
9Preamble
Central Europe2 has never in its history been more free, secure 
and prosperous. Czechs, Hungarians, Poles and Slovaks have 
beneﬁ ted hugely from the events and transformation of the past 
25 years, as have their direct neighbours including Austrians. 
The enlargement of the European Union in May 2004 has been 
an unqestionable success. Our region has embraced democ-
racy, the rule of law and market economics. It has ﬂ ourished 
thanks to the dramatic increase in trade with and investment 
from the rest of Europe. Now we are eager to use our dyna-
mism, resilience and adaptive capacity to play a more active 
role in the continent’s common future. 
2  Respectful of other deﬁ nitions, under ‘Central Europe’ we refer to the core re-
gion consisting of four Visegrád Group countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia; EU members since 2004) and Austria (an EU member since 
1995) reﬂ ecting their proximity, growing business ties and geographic location. 
Together, the CE region comprises 73 million people (some 15% of the total EU 
population); its combined GDP places it as the 15th economy of the world. CE 
is an economic backbone of a wider area of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
which also includes Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. The CEE 
area altogether has some 170 million people.
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CE – Taking Better Care 
of Itself  
1.  10 Years in the EU – What Next?
After our ﬁ rst decade in the EU, the initial distinction between the 
“old” and “new” member states has become out-dated. The great 
ﬁ nancial and economic crisis has recast Europe’s political geogra-
phy, with a North-South axis largely replacing the old one between 
“West” and “East”. Perceptions have changed accordingly. In short, 
“New Europe” no longer means the new arrivals in the club of rich 
old democracies. It means the countries which, regardless of their 
history, show the capacity for social and political innovation, coun-
tries that have dealt with the crisis more successfully than South-
ern Europe or even some countries of Northern Europe. 
Our countries fall clearly into this broader ‘new’ category.  They 
are now better positioned not only to beneﬁ t from EU member-
ship, but also to shape Europe’s future – and make their region 
stronger within it – than at any time in our recent history. 
Since the mid-1990s, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has 
shown considerable economic dynamism. The scale of change 
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in this wider region has been unprecedented3. As a result, to-
day, GDP per capita4 in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slov-
enia stands at 75-80% of the EU average while Croatia, Hungary 
and Poland are at 60%. And there is further potential for growth 
(see Chart 1). For 2014, as the euro zone and the rest of the EU 
continues its fragile recovery, forecasts suggest a growth differ-
ence of about 1 percent between the CEE and Western Europe5 
(see Chart 3). At the same time public debt levels are well be-
low European average (see Chart 2). 
Central Europe is now a growth engine for the wider EU econo-
my. The region is expected to grow faster than Western Europe 
over the next ﬁ ve to ten years, thanks to its “catch-up” dynamic, 
its lower wage costs, well-trained labour force, and less pub-
lic and private debt. Now is the time to capitalise on the op-
portunities which this relative economic strength affords. The 
challenges, both internal and external, which this presents, are 
described in this report. 
 2001  2012
 Chart 1. GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Parities in CEE;
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We argue that Central Europe should develop and cultivate its 
vision of its own region. It is not enough to rely on the slow con-
vergence of living standards. The region also needs home-grown 
aspirations. We aspire to be decision-makers in our own right.
In turbulent times in wider Europe and in the immediate neigh-
bourhood, the consolidation of the region is as important as ever. 
Central Europe should do its own homework. Improvements in 
ﬁ elds such as education are critically important, especially as 
the starting point is relatively strong and much better results 
Source: “The Economist”, based on European Commission data. 
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Chart 2. Public debt 2014 forecasts for EU countries
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can be achieved through organisational overhauls. This will 
bring new trade and investment opportunities to the region and 
also improve our position in Europe. 
Our past achievements and promising future allows us to project 
our success story internally and externally. Our countries can 
enhance regional interconnections, and make the European 
Union’s future agenda more innovative and ambitious. After our 
successful ﬁ rst decade in the EU, it is high time for Central Eu-
ropean leaders and representatives to bring this dynamism into 
the top EU positions that will be open during 2014. 
Source: “The Economist”, based on European Commission data.
 4.0 and above  2.0 to 3.9  0.0 to 1.9  -0.1 to -1.9  below -2.0
 
Chart 3. Annual GDP growth 2014 forecasts for EU countries.
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2.  Smartening up
Central Europe’s second decade in the EU requires new plans and 
ambitions. In the years to 2014, we can take for granted that the en-
vironment will become more competitive (with the rise of  emerg-
ing powers) while the EU is likely to evolve towards a stronger core 
centred around the euro zone and two or more echelons of coun-
tries around it. At the same time, internal structural challenges will 
increasingly constrain the region’s long-term growth potential. 
For now, our well-being is closely tied to the fortunes of Germany as 
a champion of the global economy. The best illustration of this are 
the linkages between Central Europe and the German supply chain 
(see Chart 4). As a recent IMF study has shown6, Central Europe is 
less linked to German domestic demand than to the international 
factors that determine Germany’s exports. The spill-over of German 
domestic demand to the V4 remains relatively small while much of 
the bilateral trade between Germany and the V4 is in intermediate 
goods. This joint exposure to demand outside of Europe is not cap-
tured by bilateral trade statistics. This means the region is vulnerable 
12
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Chart 4. Share of German value added
in total exports of European countries in 1995 and 2009
Source: “German-Central European Supply Chain-Cluster Report”, IMF Country Report 
13/263, August 20th, 2013, p. 4.
CYP
CZE
HUN
SVK
POL
AUT
BEL
FIN
SYNLUXDNK
NLD
MLT
RUS
FRA
GRC
IRLLTU
LVA
TUR
GBR
PRT
SWERUM
ESP BGRITAEST
2009
1995
16
to external shocks. But it is also an incentive. Economic integration 
with Germany should be seen as a springboard, not a trap. 
Our task now is to work out how to bridge the gap to our Western 
European peers in the next 15-20 years. This will mean systemic 
change. Our combined GDP already makes the Visegrád Group the 
world’s 15th-biggest economy. That reﬂ ects our strenuous efforts 
since 1989. But the next objective is to catch up with Germany in 
GDP per capita in purchasing-power parity terms. The distance 
between the Czech Republic (€20,270) and Germany (€28,400) is 
already smaller than between Germany and Norway (€40,100).  
Our privileged position is primarily thanks to the efﬁ ciency 
gains which followed the inﬂ ow of foreign direct investment 
both before and after accession to the European Union. The 
transformation of our industrial structure helped to fuel im-
provements in productivity7. But these advances have stalled.
Now we risk “half-wayism” - the “middle-income trap”, in which 
our traditional sources of growth deplete but we fail to ﬁ nd new 
ones. The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitive Index 
(GCI) 2013-2014 describes Hungary, Poland and Slovakia as being 
in transition from an efﬁ ciency-driven stage of economic devel-
opment to one which is innovation-driven; Austria and the Czech 
Republic are already in that category. 
In global competitiveness rankings, the best performer in the 
region is Austria at 16th place, while the V4 countries are ﬁ rmly 
in the middle ground – and some are sliding. The Czech Repub-
lic leads at 39th place, having slipped one place from two years 
earlier. Poland is second in the region with 41st place. Hungary 
underperforms at 60th and has slipped 12 places since 2011-
2012, and Slovakia even more so in 71st place8. In terms of the 
global competitiveness score, Poland’s “journey” is noteworthy, 
as it managed to surpass Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Re-
public over the span of the last seven years (see Chart 5).
All Visegrád countries suffer from their relative weakness in 
the area of innovation, which in some respect explains the scar-
17
city of R&D exchanges between them. Could they expect more 
engagement from Austria as well as the Nordic countries? 
In the last GCI Report, Austria is particularly well-ranked in 
business sophistication (8th place) and innovation (15th place). 
The Nordics are traditional leaders in most of such rankings. 
Thus they could both become a catalyst behind the common 
research and innovation drive for the region. For the partners, 
including Austria, it is also a matter of choice as to what extent 
they will want to be active in co-shaping the region´s agenda.  
The EU’s macro-regional Danube strategy as well as the strat-
egy for the Baltic Sea could also be used to create platforms 
for joint projects in the areas of R&D and innovation with Aus-
trian, Nordic and relevant German states. 
To ensure sustainable growth for the next decade, some basic 
challenges in the region have to be addressed:
 
 Austria  Czech Republic  Poland  Hungary  Slovakia
 Chart 5. The “journey” of Central European countries
 in the Global Competitiveness Index 2006-2013 
(scores from 1 to 7, with 7 corresponding to the best performance)
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•  Our immature and fragmented capital markets hamper our 
companies. Western markets provide more liquidity and are 
more attractive to investors, while venture capital is still lack-
ing in Central Europe. Our largest regional stock exchange, in 
Warsaw, is still far behind even bourses in Moscow and Istan-
bul, and its trading volume fell 26% in 2011-2012. It has opened 
talks with its counterpart in Vienna9, though the two bourses 
use different trading systems, which would make merger or 
takeover difﬁ cult. Nonethless, such an alliance could be a ma-
jor step forward towards establishing a capital-market hub for 
the region. 
•  Central Europe still has a well trained workforce but, given 
the underinvestment in public services, it risks losing that 
potential in a matter of half-a-generation. Educational sys-
tems everywhere in the region need an overhaul. In par-
ticular, university education is one of the most static ele-
ments of the region’s landscape. Academic credentials are 
unsatisfactory and lack international proﬁ le: of the top 150 
universities, none in Central Europe10. Largely successful in 
granting tens of thousands of young people university de-
grees, they have not been as good in ensuring the quality of 
education. We need more engagement of private industry 
and ﬁ nancial sector with governments to modernise the ed-
ucation system in our region to better match the demands 
of the workplace.
•  If higher value-added products and services are to make in-
roads in the region, investment in R&D and innovation will re-
quire better public policies and promotion at the regional level. 
In practical terms, Austria could contribute to the International 
Visegrád Fund11 initiating new programs focused on best prac-
tices in R&D and innovation. Cross-border collaboration be-
tween research centres has started to emerge slowly, as the 
example of the V4G4 Centre of Excellence, created in 2013 by 
four nuclear energy institutes from the region, clearly demon-
strates. On the other hand, the region’s academia mostly con-
tinues to function in a world apart; commercialisation of inven-
tions is for the sturdiest and most persistent. Unsurprisingly, 
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knowledge-economy hubs are hard to ﬁ nd between the Baltic 
Sea and the Balaton.
No policy-makers in Central Europe have any grounds for com-
placency. As they try to avoid “half-wayism”, they need to be 
aware that competitiveness is a complex phenomenon for 
which there is no quick ﬁ x. It is not only labour costs which 
count but efﬁ ciency of the institutions, predictability of the po-
litical system, quality and extent of infrastructure, good macr-
oeconomic environment, and many other factors. Only compre-
hensive action across this range of factors can deliver results. 
We need to refashion our growth model, with a dramatic en-
hancement of our global competitiveness and innovation capac-
ity. Whether such systemic change is better achieved through 
radical or more incremental moves is a matter of political choice. 
But these challenges are manageable. Many countries have 
sharply increased their income levels12. In either case, we need a 
shared sense of purpose among policy-makers, and support from 
business leaders, opinion-makers and other key stakeholders.   
3.  Better Connectivity – 
Mission Unaccomplished 
Regional economic integration requires connections. These 
come from infrastructural links as well as from regulatory con-
vergence and cooperation. Since our accession to the EU, and 
after years of neglect, much effort has been devoted to knitting 
Central Europe together. Between 2007 and 2013, €36 billion 
of the €355 billion total of EU cohesion and regional funds was 
earmarked for the development of roads, railways, ports and 
airports across the region.  Much has been achieved in trans-
port infrastructure although it has been predominantly focused 
on roads, with rail badly lagging behind. 
It is now almost possible to drive from Warsaw to Vienna on a 
highway but there is no direct highway from Warsaw to Buda-
20
pest, while the 65km-long train ride between Vienna and Bra-
tislava, the two geographically closest capitals in Europe, still 
takes one hour.  
A recent study13 by the V4 Think Tank Platform underlined that while 
many borderlands in the region are of supra-local importance, 
transport interconnections are not developed enough to link the key 
economic centres such as Silesia and upper Moravia or Budapest 
and Bratislava. The most convenient way to travel from Prague to 
Wrocław by train is through Dresden, and the only viable rail link be-
tween Košice and Cracow is through the Czech Republic. 
Ties between Central European countries, bottlenecks and 
missing connections still remain a problem in almost all direc-
 Less developed regions  Transition regions  More developed regions
 Chart 6: Regions and member states
eligible for Cohesion Policy 2014-2020 
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tions with the exception of the Czech-Slovak links (due to their 
common state before 1993). An integrated transport system will 
intensify our inter-regional trade and investment.
Visegrad countries could make better use of EU funds, since 
they will remain a net receiver of EU payments in the upcoming 
years. The new Multiannual Financial Framework for Cohesion 
Policy 2014-2020, which earmarks about EUR 127bn14 or 40% of 
total allocations to this region (see Chart 6). That corresponds 
to an average annual inﬂ ow worth 2.6% of their current GDP in 
programmed period. 
EU requirements for trans-border projects have so far been the 
single most powerful driver of our transport interconnection. 
 GNI/Head <90% of UE average  Phasing-out of support
 Other member states
 Chart 6: Regions and member states
 eligible for Cohesion Policy 2014-2020
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Efforts to coordinate investment into common transport cor-
ridors include the Central European Transport Corridor, Trans-
port Corridor 6 and the Via Carpatia. In addition, the V4 coun-
tries have collaborated on tweaking the EU’s Trans-European 
Transport Network in their favour. Logistics companies have 
also actively supported improvements of intermodal transport. 
It is important to look for alliances between national Cargo 
companies – Poland’s PKP Cargo is the second largest railway 
cargo company in Europe, while Czech ČD Cargo is the fourth. 
The failure to give trans-regional projects a high priority high-
lights the need for a list of strategic infrastructure projects, 
to synchronise national and regional targets with EU cohesion-
policy objectives, combining national and regional interests. 
In addition, every country should introduce streamlined pro-
cedures for issuing permissions, featuring the integration of 
spatial planning and land-lease permissions. Some projects 
might not be justiﬁ ed on purely commercial grounds, in which 
case they should be allowed higher regulated returns to com-
pensate for the additional risk. Finally, innovative ﬁ nancing so-
lutions should be examined, including equity participation in 
infrastructure funds, loan guarantees or targeted facilities for 
project bonds. 
4.  Enhanced Energy Security –
Work in Progress 
Much has been made at the political level of efforts to integrate 
the region’s energy markets. The most urgent energy security 
challenge is natural gas. Our gas markets are still poorly inter-
connected and highly dependent on a single supplier – Russia’s 
Gazprom. As long as Visegrád as well as neighbouring coun-
tries’ gas markets remain separate, Gazprom will ﬁ nd it easy 
to engage in political price-setting. Its space for manoeuvre 
was recently curtailed by an impressive action by the European 
Commission to ensure the Russian giant respects EU compe-
tition rules. Antitrust investigation against Gazprom will most 
23
likely result in legal action restricting the scale of its activities 
in the EU countries, thus presenting a fresh opportunity for in-
tegration of Central European gas markets. 
Despite common concerns, Central Europeans have so far been 
perceived as divided on energy issues and looking only after 
their own national interests. On the EU level, however, diplo-
mats of Visegrad countries have been effective shapers of joint 
EU responses to energy security risks to the region as demon-
strated during the gas supply disruption from Russia in 2009. 
And lately V4 governments have agreed on a common “security 
of supply” strategy, including regional emergency planning and 
increased gas storage capacities. Austria could do more to be 
involved in these talks. 
As for creating a functional regional gas market, the key ally so 
far has been the European Commission. The North-South In-
terconnections in Central and South Eastern Europe have been 
identiﬁ ed as priority corridors of its Energy Infrastructure Pack-
age, adopted in 2010. Effective interconnection of all V4 coun-
tries within the North-South Gas Corridor (NSGC) are expected 
by 2017-18: the interconnection between Slovakia and Hungary, 
constructed with the EU’s ﬁ nancial support of €30m, should be 
operational by 2015, whereas the interconnection between Slo-
vakia and Poland, with EU’s support of €210,000 for business-
case and feasibility studies, should be completed by 2017. On the 
southern end, Slovenia and Croatia are also planning to contrib-
ute critical infrastructure to the NSGC. Once ﬁ nalized, it has the 
potential to cause a geopolitical breakthrough for the region15.  
However, as a study prepared for the European Commission 
on the future development of the gas market and infrastruc-
ture in the region has concluded, the four Visegrád countries 
- in spite of having limited pipeline interconnections - do not 
face immediate risks of supply shortages. In the absence of 
such pressures, governments have tended to be unwilling to 
allow operators from the outside to enter their national mar-
kets, even if they originate from other V4 countries. Prevent-
ing new actors from entering national gas markets in Central 
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Europe would leave regional integration in this area looking 
theoretical. 
Electricity interconnections are much more ‘meshed’ in Western 
Europe although even there markets remain predominantly na-
tional. The ENTSOE’s Ten-Year Network Development Plan 2011-
202016 (which lists all the current and planned national investments 
in network development) shows too few initiatives in the CEE region 
aimed at reversing this intra-continental divide. More disquietingly, 
we do not take full advantage of the networks that already exist. We 
lag behind the Central West European (CWE) electricity market in 
the implementation of the target model for electricity markets in 
Europe. It is there that political will is most in demand. 
In all of these areas, we must deal jointly with barriers which 
hamper investment in infrastructure. These involve the com-
plexity of consultation and procedures for issuing permissions, 
with the lack of prioritisation and with the weakness of the 
regulatory framework. Harmonising tariff-setting methodol-
ogy to ensure sufﬁ cient incentives would bring big beneﬁ ts. Co-
operation among the Transmission System Operators, bringing 
the regulators more closely together could aim at regulatory 
convergence which would aid investment as well. 
Completing this agenda is not simply a question of money 
(which, thanks to the EU funding, is now more available than 
ever), but of a strong political conviction that regional inter-
connections are mutually beneﬁ cial, bringing about the effects 
of scale, of improved innovation capacity as well as of greater 
energy security.  
5.  Security and Defence Policy –
the unlikely Showcase of Trust  
During 2013, Visegrád leaders gained a new level of mutual 
trust in an area usually seen as the traditional prerogative of 
national sovereignty – security and defence policy. An impor-
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tant impulse was provided by think tanks: in 2012, a group of 
leading experts and senior ofﬁ cials of V4 countries co-authored 
the DAV4 Report with guidelines for enhanced defence collabo-
ration and ideas for practical projects17.  An intensive dialogue 
among Visegrad Group defence and foreign ministers recently 
reached a prime ministerial level. A joint statement of V4 Prime 
Ministers, meeting in Budapest in October 2013, tasked their 
Ministers of Defence to prepare a long-term vision of defence 
cooperation among their countries, improve possibilities for 
joint training and exercises, and enhance mutual defence plan-
ning. Austria as the only non-NATO country in the region has 
not been part of these efforts.
Visegrád countries’ motivations differ: Czech, Hungarian and 
Slovak defence budgets have shrunk to levels which endanger 
maintaining, let alone developing, their military capabilities 
(though joint procurement projects may help these countries 
modernise despite ﬁ nancial constraints). Poland, traditionally 
more concerned with territorial defence than the rest of the 
group, wants to use co-operation to motivate countries in the 
region to halt the depletion of their militaries and to align na-
tional threat perceptions. Poland also aspires to play a more 
important role in the European security and defence policy. 
Burden-sharing plays an important role too. As the US scales down 
its military presence in Europe, we must assume more responsibil-
 
 
Table 1
Total size of the 
army (2012)
2012 – Milit. expen-
diture (bn EUR) 
Military expend. 
as GDP %
Poland 96 000 6,7 1,95
Czech Republic 22 000 1,8 1,10
Hungary 18 000 1,0 0,99
Slovakia 13 700 0,8 1,01
Sources: SIPRI military expenditure database; CEPI updates for 2012.
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ity for our own security as well as for our immediate neighbour-
hood. Located on the frontiers of both NATO and the EU, Central 
Europe’s vital interest is to keep both frameworks politically and 
militarily strong. Visegrád countries have accumulated substan-
tial experience in co-ordinating their positions and activities within 
NATO and the EU regarding political-security issues. Their lead-
ers have supported the idea of regional initiatives to help mitigate 
identiﬁ ed shortfalls and overlaps. All V4 countries have been strong 
advocates of both NATO and EU engagement in expeditionary for-
mats (NATO Response Forces and EU Battlegroups) which the four 
countries see as mutually complementary. 
In their joint letter to Herman Van Rompuy, President of the 
European Council, ahead of the EU summit in December 2013 
which addressed further development of the Common security 
and defence policy (CSDP), the V4 prime ministers called for 
a new impetus for practical co-operation between the EU and 
NATO, especially in the area of defence planning and develop-
ment of capabilities. This could be appealing also to Austria, 
which is not a NATO member but plays a leading role in the 
EU’s CSDP operations in the Western Balkans, and contributes 
personnel to the NATO-led KFOR mission in Kosovo.
As a ﬁ rst step, the four Visegrád countries have decided to build 
a joint EU Battlegroup, available for rapid deployment in the 
ﬁ rst semester of 2016. Details of this ﬂ agship project still need 
to be worked out. Besides bringing short-term modernisation 
beneﬁ ts, it can also spur deeper collaboration among ministries 
of defence. They are already discussing how to make some of 
the unit’s elements permanent and available for future NATO 
Response Force (NRF) and EU Battlegroup (BG) rotations. 
In addition, all Visegrád armed forces face a challenge of main-
taining the pace of modernisation and transformation when 
NATO’s International Security Assisance Force mission, to 
which they heavily contribute, ends in 2014. Common training 
and exercises could give the V4 forces practical opportunities to 
maintain the inter-operability that they are currently practicing 
in Afghanistan. 
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Visegrád experts have identiﬁ ed a number of other potential 
co-operation areas, including aviation training, cyber-defence, 
military-education or medical treatment facilities. To make se-
curity and defence co-operation in the region viable in the long-
term, they also need to work on further convergence of their 
national strategic cultures. 
6.  Governance Issues  
In the last decade, each country of Central Europe has faced 
problems with the consolidation of democracy. One previous 
Polish government was accused of using institutions of the 
state against political opponents. The Slovak judiciary is not 
trusted by 70 per cent of people and even the country’s Minister 
of Justice acknowledges that conﬁ dence in the system could 
hardly be worse. The Czech Republic has been embarrassed 
by a series of high-level political and corruption scandals that 
triggered new elections in October 2013. Hungary faces strong 
criticism for, among other things, its approach to independent 
institutions, the Central Bank, the judiciary and the media. 
What we are witnessing is part of an effort to overcome Central 
Europe’s historical legacy. Frequent political and institutional 
upheavals, in particular during the 20th century, prevented 
gradual change and consolidation of democratic norms and in-
stitutions. As a result, this region has weak institutions that are 
being exploited by vested interests and established groups. In-
stitution building is still an unﬁ nished business, and good gov-
ernance in Visegrád countries often depends on the personal 
engagement of well-intentioned individuals.  
Slower growth and government austerity measures after the 
global ﬁ nancial crisis in 2008 – 2009 have contributed to gen-
eral reform fatigue in the region. In some cases, there have also 
been reform reversals with populist measures involving in-
creased state control in areas such as energy, transport, bank-
ing and pensions18.  At the same time, these are features of a 
larger European crisis that of democratic governance itself. 
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Populist politics is on the rise across the continent. Economic 
instability, high unemployment, political scandals and erosion 
of trust in the entire political class are fuelling a crisis of conﬁ -
dence in democratic institutions at both the national and the EU 
levels.  Central Europeans are not different. If more established 
European democracies ﬁ nd it extremely difﬁ cult to cope with 
the damaging implications of the current crisis, can Central Eu-
ropeans be expected to do any better? 
The picture is not uniform across the region. Examples abound 
of democratic resilience amidst all the troubling economic and 
political developments of the past few years. So far, Central Eu-
ropean voters have shown more patience, endurance and ﬂ ex-
ibility in coping with the crisis than electorates in many other 
European democracies. It may be due to the region’s historical 
experience in coping with crises and upheavals but should, nev-
ertheless, be acknowledged. The same goes for the region’s ca-
pacity for democracy innovation and responsiveness of govern-
ing institutions. Recent improvements in transparency include 
legislation making all public contracts automatically available 
on the internet (in Slovakia) or the increased independence of 
Czech police investigating high-proﬁ le corruption cases. Om-
budsmen and Supreme Audit Ofﬁ ces (SAO) are also success sto-
ries and small practical lessons that can be offered to Southern 
Europe as well as in the Western Balkans and Eastern European 
countries undergoing reforms in their own public sphere.
7.  A White and a Black Swan
Among our greatest structural challenges, demography stands 
out. The countries of Central Europe are expected to be among 
the half of the EU member states whose total population is pro-
jected to decrease over the next decades. 
Barring sharp and unlikely turnarounds in birth rates, as op-
posed to 38.4m people living in of Poland today, there will be 
only 32.6m in 2060. The Hungarian population will shrink from 
10m to 8.8m in the same time-frame, people living in the Czech 
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Chart 7. Effective economic old-age dependency ratio
(inactive population aged 65 and above
 as a percentage of the employed population aged 15 to 64)
Chart 8. Overall change in age-related expenditure
 (p.p. Of GDP) in 2010-2060, under two scenarios
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Republic from 10.7m to 10.5m and in Slovakia from 5.5m to 
5.1mn19. Social structure will change too. In Poland today 15.4 
percent of the population are over 65-years, this will rise to 34.6 
per cent in 2060. In Slovakia the same age-group will rise from 
13.8 per cent to 33.5 per cent of the population, in the Czech 
Republic the rise will be from 17.7 per cent to 30.6 per cent and 
in Hungary from 17.9 per cent to 32.2 per cent. No plausible 
increase in fertility rates will reverse the ageing of these socie-
ties. Greater longevity and low fertility are civilizational proc-
esses in most advanced economies. Immigration may partially 
smooth the effects of this phenomenon. But it is quite likely 
that CE countries will have to increase the retirement age even 
further and raise labor force participation in general. 
High effective economic old-age dependency ratio may be-
come a serious problem in the region, especially in Slovakia 
and Poland (see Chart 7).
The sustainability of public ﬁ nances and social security sys-
tems is therefore a huge challenge. In Slovakia the age-related 
increase in public spending may rise 7 percentage points or 
more (as a share of GDP) in the period until 2060. The Czech 
Republic and Hungary are in the second group of countries 
where the foreseen increase is more limited, ranging from 4 to 
7 percentage points of GDP. The increase in Poland is likely to 
be 4 percentage points of GDP (see Chart 9)20.
The world offers few examples of countries which have han-
dled the problem of ageing well. Providing high quality educa-
tion, health-care and transport and other services across the 
whole region might become very costly. The state will therefore 
need to concentrate some public services in larger communi-
ties, especially in urban and more densely populated areas. As 
with climate change, mitigation will have to be coupled with 
adaptation. 
Among the black swans, the failure to build an open, inclu-
sive and fair society stands out. We have enjoyed relative social 
peace in the two decades of transformation, and our countries 
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have stood out among the emerging countries for our relatively 
high level of equality. The Czech Republic and Slovakia’s Gini 
coefﬁ cients are lower than that for Germany (see Chart 9.) 
while, Hungary and Poland are not far behind21. The question 
remains, however, over the sustainability of this situation in 
times of scarcity and growing pressures on public expenditure. 
The greatest challenge to equality of opportunity in Central Eu-
rope are regional disparities. The transition of the 1990s cre-
ated relatively wealthy city chains. In places like Bratislava, Bu-
dapest, Prague and Warsaw the convergence process has led 
to “urban islands of wealth” with a GDP per capita well above 
 22.6-24.9  24.9-27.2  27.2-30.5  30.5-35.9  32.5-35.9
 
 
Chart 9. Gini coefficient in European countries 2012
Source:  Eurostat
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EU average. At the same time rapid economic trans-
formation has left entire regions behind. Many periph-
eral areas show too few signs of economic life to reach 
the threshold required for strong cumulative growth. 
What is more, FDI ﬂ ows have tended to concentrate in 
capital cities and stronger regions. Some Central Eu-
ropean cities are humming with creativity, celebrating 
the local talent and providing an ecosystem conducive 
for innovation. Such islands of openness have to be 
cherished and nurtured in the future. 
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Chart 10. Regional GDP per capita in pps
(% of EU27 average) at NUTS 3 level in European countries 2010
Source:  Eurostat
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Urban policy has not been a big strength of Central Europe ei-
ther, with local governments’ preference for targeting periph-
eral, green-ﬁ eld areas rather than modernisation of the ex-
isting ones. This has led to the phenomenon of “uncontrolled 
suburbanisation”. Revitalisation of cities has been a grossly 
neglected challenge. In place of the more visible racial or reli-
gious segregation in the French cities, we have a much subtler 
social segregation and exclusion. The task of improving hous-
ing is largely absent from the agenda for city renewal. 
On top of that, Central Europe has another major demographic 
and social challenge. Three of its countries have large Roma 
minorities - the Czech Republic (up to 1.9% of total population), 
Hungary (up to 7.5%) and Slovakia (up to 9%)22. The vast major-
ity of Roma continue to live in poverty, and represent a signiﬁ -
cant, yet underutilised potential in the region’s economy. While 
the non-Roma population is ageing and shrinking, the Roma 
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 Chart 11. Employment gap among Roma 
and non-Roma neighbours for men (left) and women (right) %
Source: The World Bank
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minority on average is youthful and growing. About a 
third of them are under the age of 15, but nearly 4 out 
of 5 Roma pupils do not complete secondary education. 
Moreover, Roma adults continue to be excluded from 
the labour market (see Chart 11).
This trend is particularly worrying as the Roma try to 
enter the labour market at higher rates than the ma-
jority population – with 1 in 6 entrants in Hungary and 
Slovakia being a young Roma. While many want to work 
and have (mostly low and uncertiﬁ ed) skills, their job 
search is limited by geographical separation from job 
opportunities, long-term unemployment in their com-
munities, and discrimination in the labour market. 
Much of the future competitiveness of Hungary and 
Slovakia, in particular, will depend on how fast these 
countries can improve the employability of excluded 
Roma and their integration into the mainstream edu-
cation systems. 
The European Commission recently incorporated Roma 
inclusion into its Europe 2020 economic strategy, ask-
ing member states to present individual National Roma 
Integration Strategies.  The emphasis is put on the col-
lection of reliable data necessary for measuring each 
country’s results and planning follow-up actions. For 
ﬁ ve EU members (including the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, and Slovakia), the Commission already proposed 
country-speciﬁ c recommendations. Nevertheless, ex-
perience from the previous EU budget period (2007 - 
2013) has shown insufﬁ cient government capacity and 
lack of political appetite to make such changes – mak-
ing regional collaboration and exchange of best prac-
tices related to Roma inclusion among Central Euro-
pean countries even more essential. 
Finally, there is the question of openness. With the ex-
ception of Austria, so far the rest of Central Europe has 
not been a huge magnet for immigration, for which it 
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also remains unprepared. Although migration tends to follow 
established patterns, the region’s ability to open to other cul-
tures and inﬂ uences and absorb the diversity of skills and po-
tential wealth of experience from others need to improve. The 
most tangible and overwhelmingly positive experience is that of 
opening up to Ukrainian seasonal workers who have ﬁ lled many 
important gaps in Central Europe’s labour market. Around the 
region, there are also pockets of substantial immigrant com-
munities from Asia, often drawing on the Communist-era edu-
cational links with countries such as Vietnam. Nevertheless, 
fully-ﬂ edged immigration strategies are often in early stages 
of policy formulation, with the Czech Republic being more ad-
vanced in this area than the other Visegrád countries. The na-
tional asylum policies and their practical implementation also 
require reform.  
3  Economic growth in CEE before the crisis averaged 4 per cent. See Golden 
Growth. Restoring the lustre of the European economic model. World Bank , 2012, 
p. 46.   
4  Measured in purchasing power parities, EU average is 100%. 
5  European Economic Forecast Winter 2013: European Commission http://
ec.europa.eu/economy_ﬁ nance/publications/european_economy/2013/pdf/
ee1_en.pdf 
6  German-Central European Supply Chain-Cluster Report: IMF; 20 August 2013.
7  See Erik Berglof, Chief Economist of the EBRD, “Transition in emerging Eu-
rope – what do we learn about the “Middle Income Trap?”, ECB conference, 10 
July 2013. 
8  The Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013, World Economic Forum. 
9  Wiener Börse AG acquired majority stakes in the stock exchanges of Budapest, 
Ljubljana and Prague forming CEE Stock Exchange Group (CEESEG).
10  The Times Higher Education World University Rankings 2013-2014
11  The IVF was established in 2000 as source of funding for common cultural, 
scientiﬁ c, research and educational projects, youth exchanges, promotion of 
tourism and cross-border cooperation, has by the end of 2012 supported more 
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than 3,700 projects and awarded over 1,700 scholarships and artist residen-
cies, worth in total nearly 47 million euro. See www.visegradfund.org
12  Zheng Bingwen, director at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and 
scholar of the middle income trap, claims that „Japan spent 12 years to get out 
of the trap, Singapore spent 11 years, Hong Kong spent 11 years, and Korea spent 
only 7 years”. Quoted in Chen Xiaoyi, „China to stride over middle income trap 
between 2021-2025“, Morning Whistle, 9 November 2012. 
13  Strengthening the Territorial Dimension of the V4. Macro-regional Develop-
ment and territorial cohesion: selected spatial aspects. September 2013. 
14  Cohesion Policy 2014-2020 (http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/what/future/
eligibility/index_en.cfm)
15  North-South Gas Corridor: Geopolitical Breakthrough in Central Europe. 
PISM Report, December 2013. Available at: http://www.pism.pl/publications/
reports
16  “Monitoring Update – Table of TYNDP 2012 Projects”, ENTSOE, 1 July 2013
17  The DAV4 (Defence Austerity in the Visegrad 4) project was facilitated by the 
Central European Policy Institute in Bratislava with the support of the Inter-
national Visegrad Fund. The project partners included the Polish Institute of 
International Affairs, the In-ternational Centre for Democratic Transition in 
Budapest and Czech Jagello 2000. Full report is available here: http://www.
cepolicy.org/publications/dav4-full-report-towards-deeper-visegrad-de-
fence-partnership.
18  EBRD Transition Report 2013: Stuck in Transition? Chapter 1, p. 16. 
19  The 2012 Ageing Report. Economic and Budgetary Projections for the 27 
Member States (2010-2060), European Commission 2012
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CE in the EU
When Central European countries entered the European Un-
ion in 2004, they were sometimes seen as a potential source 
of problems rather than part of the solution. The scare factor 
was blown out of proportion in the old member states as it be-
came a foretaste of the challenges associated with globalisa-
tion. The European Commission set the record straight when it 
calculated that there were no more than 142 Polish plumbers in 
France rather than the many thousands that were feared. The 
ﬁ nancial and economic crisis has since changed that logic pro-
foundly with the South replacing the East as the object of anxi-
ety and occasional scorn in the prosperous (mostly northern) 
states. Some of the sensitivities, most notably in the area of the 
free ﬂ ow of persons, have not disappeared, as evidenced by the 
offensive on the part of David Cameron, the British Prime Min-
ister, to limit EU migrants’ rights to social protection.  
The EU has been in crisis, ﬁ rst constitutional and then economic, 
for eight out of the ten years of Central Europe’s membership. 
This has complicated the region’s prospects of having a signiﬁ -
cant say over the European agenda. As a late entrant to the club, 
Central Europe has had to spend more time adjusting to the rules 
of the game which have taken shape over the previous ﬁ ve dec-
ades, than speaking its mind. However, as the most severe condi-
tions of crisis subside, Central Europeans need to have a clear 
idea on what they want to achieve in the post-crisis Europe. 
2
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8.  Central Europe and the New 
Political Geography of the EU
So far, Central Europe’s increasing strength has to a large ex-
tent come from the region’s close and beneﬁ cial relationship 
with Germany. Its drivers have been primarily socio-economic. 
Thousands of Central Europeans who have been present on 
the German labour market as (mostly) seasonal workers, for 
years; and numerous ties between the German Mittelstand and 
their opposite numbers in the region have meant that at the in-
terpersonal level, the relations had often become impressively 
engaged and were followed by political proximity. The model 
works well creating enormous beneﬁ ts for both sides but it will 
need a qualitative depth in the future. 
The political reality was slow to catch up. For years, German 
dominance was feared in the region while conspiracy theories 
about Berlin’s hidden agendas abounded. This has been laid 
to rest, and Central Europe now enjoys a comfortably close, 
two-way relationship with Germany. There are differences, for 
example in the ﬁ eld of energy with Germany phasing out nu-
clear power by 2022, but they are outweighed by the common 
economic and political interests. 
An intimate relationship with Germany is a starting point, not 
a goal. We have slain the ghosts of the past, but we have not 
yet realised the promise of the future. Diversifying our trade 
and investment beyond single countries and single industries 
does not just improve our resilience—it also improves our at-
tractiveness. The more we innovate, research, develop and add 
value, the more integrated and competitive we become. This 
goes beyond economics: we have our own perspective on secu-
rity – and on the growing geopolitical competition which, like it 
or not, is being forced on Europe from the east. We are eager 
to cooperate with Germany—and, when we disagree with the 
authorities in Berlin (on nuclear energy, for instance), to con-
tribute to the debate there about our common future. We do 
not see Germany as a hegemon, real, potential or imagined. 
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But we need to ensure that  Germany’s economic and political 
strength is matched by a conﬁ dent and constructive voice from 
our region—especially if  the United Kingdom, previously Cen-
tral Europe’s spiritual brother in the EU, departs to an unknown 
geopolitical destination, signiﬁ cantly weakening its inﬂ uence 
within EU. 
The euro zone’s future depends largely on establishing new 
banking and ﬁ nancial rules, and on pursuing deep changes in 
Europe’s troubled southern and western countries. Our role is 
to be a factor of cohesion. We can be a go-between on issues 
of structural reform which we have pursued much more effec-
tively than the countries of Southern Europe. 
9. The Euro Mirage
The euro zone will remain the EU’s main centre of gravity, ir-
respective of whether its reconstruction process will continue 
“muddling through” or if it will leapfrog. Non-members are un-
likely to have an ambitious agenda: they are a diverse group 
of countries with separate agendas. This cohesion will be fur-
ther tested as the UK prepares to renegotiate the terms of its 
membership in the EU. Slovakia is the only euro zone country 
among the V4 countries and its experience is mostly positive, 
although sometimes politically charged. At the moment there is 
little prospect that the three largest regional economies – Po-
land, Czech Republic and Hungary – will join before the end of 
the decade. The issue is dormant in their domestic political de-
bates. At the same time, reforms in the euro zone are far from 
neutral from the point of view of the wider unity and cohesion in 
Europe. And it should be noted that the euro zone continues to 
grow (with Estonia and Latvia as its newest members).
Central Europeans are thus a microcosm of Europe’s emerging 
divisions. There are three possible approaches which this re-
gion can take with regard to the emerging new EU architecture. 
In the ﬁ rst scenario, efforts would concentrate on completing 
the region’s accession to the euro zone. This would help region-
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al ties and allow for pursuing regional market consolidation. 
In the run-up to that, the region would need to insist on the 
inclusiveness of the euro zone architecture which would make 
the subsequent accession process easier.  
In the second scenario, the question of euro zone member-
ship is placed on the back-burner as long as reconstruc-
tion of the common currency remains an ongoing process. 
The argument would prevail the incompleteness of the 
EMU makes it impossible for non-members to have a fully-
fledged assessment of the project they would be joining and 
its implications. The risk is not negligible that as the euro 
zone fine-tunes its new procedures and mechanisms, the 
gap becomes wider, with non-members finding it difficult to 
relate to the reshaped economic governance system in the 
new EMU.  
In the third scenario the Central European non-members de-
cide to not join the common currency for the foreseeable future. 
Two options are then possible, depending on political decisions. 
The region can either allow itself to be guided by events in the 
euro zone, responding to them and hedging any possible risks 
which they might create. Alternatively, it can pursue an activist 
agenda, irrespective of not being at the centre of developments 
in the euro zone. 
•  “The low road option”: We become increasingly peripheral 
to the key political and economic processes taking place in 
the euro zone. Some countries spend more time identifying 
partnership opportunities outside the EU, including among 
emerging economies. We would shadow decisions in the 
euro zone but, as an outsider, have no say over them. 
•  “The high road option”: We move aggressively to formulate 
our own ambitious agenda in the EU which stretches from 
issues of the single market to foreign and security policy. 
This agenda becomes a point of reference in EU dossiers, 
especially the digital agenda. Our assertive efforts help to 
blunt political controversy over euro zone accession. 
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Central Europeans’ best bet is to defuse the issue of euro zone 
membership politically and start looking at it from the per-
spective of the region’s own future agenda, rather than ex-
clusively as a past obligation. The discussion should transcend 
the transfer of sovereignty, which remains a highly sensitive 
one, and focus on how membership in the euro zone would 
strengthen our prospects for stability and growth. 
While the ﬁ rst of the scenarios drawn above is most desirable, we 
should use pro-actively the next few years to prepare for it. We should 
insist on taking part in the decision-making on the future governance 
of the euro zone and ensure a fair treatment for non-euro members. 
Those from the region who are not yet euro zone members should 
join all the mechanisms open to non-members in order to retain 
inﬂ uence and secure our interests. This includes the banking union, 
membership in which would allow the region to beneﬁ t from en-
hanced investor conﬁ dence.  Our operating assumption should be 
that the euro zone reconstruction is about creating a zone of sta-
bility and macroeconomic security. While it is still disparaged as an 
emerging market, we cannot miss out on closer integration. 
10.  Central Europe in the EU:
the Future Agenda 
Apart from the euro zone issues, which remain crucial for the 
region’s future position in the new European Union, there are at 
least three other sets of questions where the engagement of 
Central Europe is important: 
• The future model of integration, 
• Restoring conditions for growth in Europe,  
• Europe’s place in the world.
On the ﬁ rst question, the EU is a tilting towards a new type of 
inter-governmentalism, in which all key decisions are at the 
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mercy of the power-plays staged at the European Council.  New 
intergovernmental agencies – such as the secretariat of the 
European Stability Mechanism - are tasked with running the 
extraordinary programmes launched as part of the euro zone 
rescue process. The space for discretionary decision-making 
has grown enormously. Community institutions have been em-
powered in some regards and crippled in others. They have new 
competences, including the area of macroeconomic surveil-
lance, but remain in a subservient role whenever issues with 
ﬁ scal or ﬁ nancial relevance come up for discussion. 
Central Europe has watched this development with growing 
unease. As champions of the community method in the past, 
countries of the region have been well aware of the risks in-
volved in the weakening of the level-playing ﬁ eld in Europe 
which has followed the gradual abandonment of the community 
method. As mostly small countries, we mistrust the intergov-
ernmental method which favours big EU states. 
The rise of intergovernmentalism poses intricate challenges 
with respect to the democratic legitimacy of European inte-
gration. Closer involvement of national parliaments will be one 
of the ways to address it. The region’s legislatures should pre-
pare to translate better what goes on at the European level to 
the public at home. 
Central Europe, however, should have its own agenda of a more 
balanced European Union, in which the claim to leadership is 
not limited to the largest and most powerful countries. An im-
portant role has to be played by bilateral and inter-regional ties 
with both countries of the Baltic Sea basin as well as Southern 
Europe. Finally, Central Europe could deﬁ ne a new modus oper-
andi with the United Kingdom. 
Most Central European countries have positioned themselves 
as the European Commission’s best friends. This strategy has 
many merits. It helps to stall the creeping introduction of the 
‘new inter-governmentalism’ and induces Central European 
countries to think less about their immediate interests and 
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more about the interests of the Union at large. Noble as it is, 
this approach will not sufﬁ ce if it is not coupled with a powerful 
drive at the reform of community institutions. 
We will lead calls to make the European Commission and the 
European Parliament more effective and accountable. Apart 
from administering common policies, the Commission should 
focus on actions involving growth and “network” areas such as 
energy. It must maintain a robust competition policy and ensure 
a level-playing ﬁ eld among European enterprises. It should 
also strengthen its role as an enabler of common activities in 
ﬁ elds such as innovation. 
We should lead EU efforts aimed at revitalisation of its eco-
nomic model and restoring growth. We want to complete the 
single market in services and to enhance co-operation in the 
digital agenda, setting an example for others to follow. We want 
a ﬂ agship competitiveness agenda for the EU’s new institution-
al cycle 2014-2020, improving Europe’s competitiveness and 
infrastructure. 
Given Central Europe’s growing engagement in the global trad-
ing system, the region is bound to beneﬁ t from new arrange-
ments aimed at deepening the EU’s trade and investment links 
with outside actors, including above all with the United States 
in the context of TTIP. A comprehensive trade and investment 
agreement with the US would help technology and know-how 
transfers, increase capital ﬂ ows and offer better availability of 
products and services.  
Finally, we want to re-launch the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. A weak decision-making centre in Brussels 
has been hamstrung by often confused decision-making in the 
national capitals. A revamped CFSP would have a lower but 
more solid common denominator, “ﬁ lling the gaps” in the EU’s 
security and defence posture. In a more hands-on approach to-
wards the neighbourhood the EU can be a facilitator of conﬂ ict 
resolution and stabilisation in the South—and a transformative 
power in the East. 
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We cannot remain a hostage of the euro zone crisis 
and the new geometry it is creating. A self-conﬁ dent 
Central Europe in a regalvanised EU of the future will 
be better aware of its interests as well as willing and 
able to pursue its own vision. We must be able to pool 
our voting power in the Council and present joint ini-
tiatives to other EU Partners. Central Europe’s voice 
needs to be loud and clear.  
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List of Recommendations
We can be proud of our achievements in the ﬁ rst decade since join-
ing the European Union. But the second decade has to be markedly 
different, both for internal and external reasons. The public, having 
tasted hard-won prosperity, however modest and fragile, now has 
higher aspirations. Structural constraints, such as demography, will 
bear heavily on our growth prospects. The EU is now very different 
than it was in 2004. Although the worst of the crisis may be over, Eu-
rope as a whole is likely to remain a low-growth area for some time 
to come. This will hardly be conducive for the dynamic catching-up 
process which we hoped for when we joined. 
We need a shared sense of purpose among the region’s policy-mak-
ers, and support from business leaders, opinion-makers and other 
key stakeholders. A self-conﬁ dent Central Europe must be better 
aware of its common regional interests and know how to capitalise 
on its relative economic strength. This type of approach would not 
only beneﬁ t the region but improve prospects for the EU at large. Our 
recommendations for increasing the political and economic strength 
of our region in Europe are:
I. Consolidation and Strong Fundamentals
1.  Central European governments and business leaders need to fo-
cus more on fostering regional interconnections, bringing about 
3
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the effect of scale and generate region-wide beneﬁ ts. Greater 
integration of Central Europe’s transport system and energy 
markets across borders will increase regional trade and ensure 
greater energy security. 
2.  Governments in the region should deﬁ ne strategies for better 
anchoring the innovation-driven model of growth and creating 
mutual synergies along the way, mainly through radically im-
proved cooperation between universities and business and re-
ducing risk-aversion. 
3.  The industrial and ﬁ nancial sector should become more en-
gaged with governments to modernise higher education to bet-
ter match the demands of the workplace and labour market 
needs.  Otherwise Central Europe risks losing the potential of a 
well trained workforce in a matter of half-a-generation.
4.  Improving the region’s small and fragmented capital markets is 
crucial for Central European companies to be able to meet their 
needs. Establishing a larger, more liquid and better integrated 
capital-market hub in our region is more important than the is-
sue of where it will be located.
5.  The region would beneﬁ t from closer co-operation with Austria 
and better network connections with the Nordic and Baltic coun-
tries. Together, Visegrád countries, Austria and the Nordics can 
more effectively focus on the dramatic enhancement of the re-
gion’s global competitiveness and innovation capacity.  Intensive 
cooperation in the format of “V4+” should be applied to areas rel-
evant for ensuring sustainable economic growth (regional infra-
structure, investment into R&D, innovation performance, quality 
of education and job-training).
6.  The large volume of EU cohesion funds allocated for Visegrád 
countries in the period 2014-2020 will provide unique public in-
vestment opportunities in the next decade. Closer co-operation 
in the process of implementation of EU funds, in particular in 
cross-border transport infrastructure, joint R&D programming 
and investment in Roma inclusion should be explored. Sharing 
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of best practices, deﬁ ning regional performance benchmarks 
and use of economies of scale would increase the efﬁ ciency of 
allocated funds. Also, the region’s governments should aim at 
initial regulatory convergence, introducing streamlined proce-
dures for issuing permissions, integration of spatial planning 
and land-lease permission.   
7.  A fundamental interest of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slo-
vakia is to address the dire situation of the young and growing 
Roma population, which will constitute an ever growing share of 
the labour market entrants. The governments should dramati-
cally increase the quality and access to education, starting with 
early childhood education, where it is not available. They should 
introduce active labor market measures to improve market inte-
gration of Roma adults through targeted employment services, 
such as second-chance education and short-cycle vocational 
training. 
II.  Conﬁ dence and Ambition
at the EU Level
1.  Central Europe’s self-conﬁ dence inside the EU has gradually 
built up over the past 10 years. In particular, the Visegrád Group 
became a credible format and “trademark” within the EU institu-
tions based on an improved capacity to exert inﬂ uence on issues 
of common interest. The region must be better willing and able 
to pursue them in interaction with other EU partners. Its recent 
achievements and promising future allow it to move on to the 
next stage: more active EU policy-making and stronger shaping 
of the EU’s future agenda. 
2.  Central Europe’s trademark in the EU should be its vigorous 
pursuit of an active competitiveness agenda. Together with the 
Nordic-Baltic countries (and possibly with the UK), Central Eu-
rope could lead efforts in the ﬁ eld of the digital agenda with par-
ticular attention given to the support of start-up companies and 
digital skills. 
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3.  Despite the different level of European integration of our coun-
tries, Central Europe is one economic area. This region must not 
remain a hostage of the euro zone crisis and the new asymmet-
ric geometry it is creating in the EU. Non-members should start 
approaching the question of euro zone membership from the 
perspective of the region’s own future agenda and the extent to 
which it would strengthen the region’s prospects for stability and 
growth. The euro zone reconstruction is about creating a zone 
of stability and macroeconomic security. Austria and Slovakia 
should consistently consult the region’s “pre-ins” on the future 
governance of the euro zone. Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary should join all the mechanisms which are open to non-
members in order to retain inﬂ uence. 
4.  The EU’s foreign and security policy must advocate continous 
robust engagement in the neighbourhood where the EU’s inﬂ u-
ence is the strongest (keeping the EU enlargement to the Bal-
kans on track, fostering the EU’s transformative power in the 
East, and staying engaged with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia). 
The Visegrád EU Battlegroup plan should be used as a catalyst 
for deeper collaboration on other security and defence issues 
(procurement, cyber-capabilities, training and education), thus 
leading towards gradual convergence of national strategic cul-
tures and security threat perceptions in the region. 
5.  Central Europeans should lead calls to make the Commission 
and the European Parliament more effective and accountable. 
They should support a stronger role for the European Com-
mission, as a guardian of the Treaties, so as to refrain from 
spreading intergovernmental methods. At the same time, more 
involvement of national parliaments into the EU affairs should 
be pursued. It is high time for Central European countries to 
present a joint candidate for at least one top EU position which 
will be open later in 2014. 
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